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RECENT DECISIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL CONTROL-INJUNCTIVE EXTENSION OF 
THE RATE SusPENSION PERIOD UNDER THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT-
Plaintiffs, two interstate carriers and a municipal corporation, and defend-
ants, four railroad companies, were parties to an investigation and sus-
pension proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission.1 Section 
15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act2 allows the Commission to suspend 
the effectiveness of rate revisions proposed by carriers for seven months 
while it is deciding whether to approve them. If no decision is reached by 
the end of the suspension period, the proposed rates automatically become 
effective subject to a subsequent determination of their validity by the ICC. 
Expiration of the order suspending defendants' rate proposals was im-
minent when, in an unprecedented attempt to maintain the status quo 
pending a final Commission decision, the plaintiffs brought an original 
action in a federal district court seeking to enjoin the application of the 
disputed tariff schedules. The district court found, as a matter of fact, 
that, if the proposed reductions were to go into effect as required by the 
Interstate Commerce Act, there was grave danger that the plaintiffs would 
suffer irreparable harm. The court, however, denied injunctive relief on 
the ground that jurisdiction over rate suspensions is vested exclusively in 
the. ICC by section 15(7) of the act.3 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit refused to grant plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction pending ap-
peal, but did grant a continuance of its previously issued temporary re-
straining order.4 On application to Mr. Justice Black5 for an extension 
of the temporary restraining order until the Supreme Court could con-
sider plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari, held, application granted. 
Mr. Justice Black commented favorably on the plaintiffs' prospects of ob-
taining review by the Supreme Court, and pointed out that the Supreme 
Court has never interpreted section 15(7) as substantially destroying federal 
court jurisdiction to restrain conduct which inflicts irreparable damage. 
Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 83 Sup. Ct. I (1962). 
The Supreme Court has granted the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari,0 
justifying Mr. Justice Black's favorable prediction and emphasizing the 
genuine importance of the question presented. The case is extremely sig-
nificant for, although plaintiffs' action is unique, its position in challeng-
1 Grain in Multiple Car Shipments-River Crossings to the South, I. &: S. No. 7656 
(1962). 
2 41 Stat. 486 (1920), as amended 44 Stat. 1447 (1927), 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1958). 
3 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., Civil No. 10224, N.D. Ala., Aug. 2, 1962. 
4 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 308 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1962). 
5 Sitting in his capacity as Circuit Justice. 
6 371 U.S. 859 (1962). As a practical matter, this means plaintiffs have succeeded. 
It is very likely that the ICC will reach a decision in the rate proceeding and moot 
the question before the Supreme Court can consider it. Of course, the question remains, 
if the Commission decision is adverse to the plaintiffs, whether they would have the 
right to an injunction while the initial decision is being appealed. 
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ing a carrier's proposed rate reductions before the ICC is not. In recent 
years over ninety percent of the rate protests filed before the ICC have 
involved proposed reductions similar to those of the defendants in the 
principal case.7 While none of the opinions in the principal case clearly 
states the allegations of irreparable injury made by the plaintiffs, the in-
juries contemplated seem to be no different from those which would be 
suffered from the collection, under section 15(7), of most protested rates 
which may subsequently be found to be unreasonably and unlawfully low. 
The district court, in addition, indicated that, if the rates were to become 
effective, the plaintiffs would have no adequate legal remedy under sec-
tion 8 of the act.8 If this is true in the principal case, it is unlikely that 
section 8 would provide an adequate remedy in most other rate reduction 
disputes. The relatively great importance of the rates involved in this 
case9 does not appear to be a valid reason for limiting the finding of 
section S's inadequacy to this case alone. It seems apparent, then, if the 
Supreme Court holds in favor of district court jurisdiction, that applica-
tion for similar injunctions will become an extremely popular tactic in 
the area of ICC rate regulation. 
The key question, of course, is: Does the federal district court have 
the requisite jurisdiction to grant the plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction? 
Plaintiffs' action is an original one before the federal district court, and 
jurisdiction can be appropriately invoked under section 1331 of the United 
States Code10 as a general federal question or, more specifically, under 
section 1337 as a case arising under a federal act regulating commerce. 
It can also be demonstrated that federal equity powers would, in the ab-
sence of statutory limitations, provide equitable relief in the principal 
case. A survey of the utilization of federal injunctive powers in analogous 
areas reveals that a federal court can, when the situation warrants it, in-
voke its equity powers in order to preserve the status quo pending resolu-
tion of a trial court proceeding.11 Federal court injunctions have also 
been granted to stay the execution of a lower court judgment pending 
review of that judgment upon appeal,12 and, similarly, to stay the en-
forcement of administrative orders pending a review of the matter by a 
federal court.13 In addition, parties to proceedings before other federal 
7 Murphy, Problems in Transportation Rate Making, 26 ICC PRAc. J. II38, 1141 
(1959). 
s Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., Civil No. 10224, N.D. Ala., Aug. 2, 1962. 
9 Traffic World, Sept. 1, 1962, p. 92. 
10 28 U.S.C. § 1.331 (1958). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1958), which grants "juris-
diction ••• to ••• enjoin •.• any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission." 
This does not confer jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' original action. 
11 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 290 (1947); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank 
&: Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &: P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 675 (1935). See WALSH, EQUITY 
297-98 (1930). 
12 In re McKenzie, 180 U.S. 536, 550 (1901); In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200 (1891); 
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9 (1942) (dictum). 
1s Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, supra note 12. 
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agencies have received injunctive relief to postpone action by the parties 
until the agency can rule upon the questions in issue.14 Therefore, it 
would appear that, by analogy, the federal equity power would extend 
to granting the relief prayed for in the principal case. 
It is widely recognized, however, that Congress has the power to con-
trol the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.15 Section 15(7) of 
the Interstate Commerce Act reads, in part: "If the proceeding has not been 
concluded . . . within the period of suspension, the proposed change of 
rate . . . shall go into effect at the end of such period. . . ." On its face, 
this language seems to settle the entire question, by expressly limiting the 
suspension period and contemplating no method of extension, unless, of 
course, the language can be construed to be inapplicable to the situation 
presented in the principal case. 
The basic provision of section 15(7), the power to suspend proposed 
carrier rate schedules and to investigate their lawfulness, was first intro-
duced into the act by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.16 The legislative 
history of this amendment specifically indicates that the statutorily-estab-
lished suspension period was not considered to be open to extension. 
Placement of the power to suspend in the ICC was viewed as an extraor-
dinary interference with the right of carriers to initiate their own rates,17 
and members of Congress expressed grave concern over the constitutionality 
of any indefinite suspension period.18 Therefore, although other plans 
were considered,19 a definite suspension period was expressly incorporated 
into the statutory provisions. The logical conclusion, thus, appears to be 
that the same congressional policy which limited the ICC's power under 
section 15(7) would also preclude any injunctive extension of the statutory 
period by a federal court.20 This conclusion is arguably weakened by the 
fact that the Mann-Elkins Act was passed in an era of rapidly rising car-
rier rates, and the problem of competitive rate reductions presented by the 
principal case was never really considered in the drafting of this section.21 
14 West India Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) 
(leading case); Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal 
Ass'n, 183 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Reeber v. Rossell, 91 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 
1950); Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), appeal dis• 
missed, 336 U.S. 941 (1949). 
15 E.g., Yak.us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 
182 (1943). See generally Hart, The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1362 (1953). 
16 36 Stat. 552. The original suspension period was set at 120 days. In 1927 the 
act was amended and the present seven-month period introduced. 44 Stat. 1448 (1927), 
49 u.s.c. § 15(7) (1958). 
17 See 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ColltMISSION 52 (1931). 
18 45 CoNG. R.Ec. 3472 (1910) (remarks of Senator Elkins, co-sponsor of the bill). 
19 A minority report of the Senate committee considering the suspension power 
recommended an indefinite period continuing until the Commission had made a final 
ruling. 45 CoNG. R.Ec. 2823 (1910). 
20 See generally Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, HARVARD LEGAL EssA.Ys 
213, 214-18 (1934). 
21 Debate in the Senate on Senate Bill 6737, and in the House on the corresponding 
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In fact, it was strongly urged by a carrier in a 1911 ICC proceeding that 
the suspension power did not extend to proposed rate reductions.22 Sub-
sequent amendments of section 15(7), however, were made by congressmen 
who realized and considered the problem of competitive rate reductions,23 
and who made no provision for the relief that plaintiff is claiming in the 
principal case. 
Due to the fact that the jurisdictional question involved is one of first 
impression under the Interstate Commerce Act, the relevant case law is 
far less damaging to plaintiffs' position than the "plain meaning" inter-
pretation of section 15(7). Prior to the passage of the Mann-Elkins Act 
a minority of lower federal courts issued injunctions to prevent the col-
lection of newly published rates previous to an ICC decision as to their Iaw-
fulness.24 These injunctions resulted in the type of indefinite suspension 
advocated by the plaintiffs; however, after the power to suspend and in-
vestigate was granted to the ICC, the courts unanimously construed it as 
an exclusive grant, and they refused to interfere with Commission deci-
sions granting, refusing, or vacating suspensions.25 However, the prob-
lem of federal court maintenance of the status quo until a Commission 
decision did not arise again until the present time. This was due to a 
railroad practice, just recently abandoned, of accepting voluntary exten-
sion of the suspension period,26 and a general feeling among carriers and 
shippers that this sort of remedy was simply not available under the 
act.27 The exclusiveness of ICC power and discretion over rate suspensions 
has recently been challenged by several federal court decisions enjoining 
the application of reduced rates after the Commission had ordered a vaca-
tion of their original suspension order.28 While these decisions aid plain-
tiffs' position by clouding the limits of federal court jurisdiction in the 
area, the large majority of cases construing section 15(7) still support the 
measure, H.R. 17536, was limited solely to the problem of unreasonable rate increases. 
See 45 CONG. REc. 3472, 5846 (1910); Hilton, Barriers to Competitive Ratemaking, 29 
ICC PRAc. J. 1083 (1962). 
22 Suspension of Reduced Rates on Packing-House Products, 21 I.C.C. 68, 70 (1911). 
23 41 Stat. 486 (1920), amended by 44 Stat. 1447 (1927), amended by 54 Stat. 912 (1940), 
49 u.s.c. § 15(7) (1958). 
24 E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs. Ass'n, 165 Fed. I (9th Cir. 
1908); Great No. Ry. v. Kalispell Lumber Co., 165 Fed. 25 (9th Cir. 1908). Contra, e.g., 
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Macon Grocery Co., 166 Fed. 206 (5th Cir. 1909). See 
Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great No. Ry., 281 U.S. 412, 429 (1930), where the Court 
stated that the weight of authority was against granting injunctive relief in these cases. 
25 Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great No. Ry., supra note 24; M. C. Kiser Co. v. 
Central of Ga. Ry., 239 Fed. 718 (5th Cir. 1917); Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United 
States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935). 
26 l SH.ARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 203. 
27 Brief for Appellant, p. IO, principal case, petition for cert. granted, 371 U.S. 859 
(1962). 
28 Amarillo-Borger Express, Inc. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex.), prob. 
juris. noted, 352 U.S. 817, remanded for dismissal as moot, 352 U.S. 1028 (1956). Accord, 
Long Island R.R. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). 
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view that, for most purposes, the suspension power is held exclusively 
by the ICC.29 
Cases considering the utilization of federal injunctive powers to pre-
serve the status quo during proceedings before other federal agencies 
generally hold that the courts lack. the requisite jurisdiction to entertain 
such proceedings.30 Yet, again in isolated cases, federal courts have recently 
exhibited a willingness to assume jurisdiction in areas previously thought 
to be reserved exclusively to administrative tribunals.31 These cases in-
volved injunctions issued for the sole purpose of maintaining the status 
quo pending an administrative determination on the merits of complaints 
brought before the Federal Maritime Board. The injunctions issued relate, 
as they would in the principal case, to areas where the courts have no 
jurisdiction to make a decision on the merits of the issues involved. These 
cases, however, were not decided under an act which contains a suspension 
provision similar to section 15(7). 
An argument based on the recent cases challenging the exclusiveness 
of ICC jurisdiction under section 15(7) and upon the somewhat analogous 
authority found in the FMB cases can be made to uphold federal district 
court jurisdiction in the principal case. On the other hand, the general 
case law and legislative history provide a much stronger basis for reaching 
the conclusion that federal courts do not have the requisite jurisdiction 
to entertain such an action. In order to allow a federal court to extend 
the suspension period as set out in section 15(7), the Supreme Court would 
have to go through a process akin to the judicial redrafting of a statute. 
While this may have beneficial results for plaintiffs, it could, as stated 
earlier, become a regular tactic in rate reduction disputes similar to that 
involved in the principal case. A new procedure, never envisioned by Con-
gress, would thus be added to the field of rate regulation. The balance of 
interests achieved in the complex and complete scheme of regulation con-
templated by Congress when it drafted the Interstate Commerce Act should 
seemingly not be upset by the addition of such judicially-created proce-
dures. 
John Eppel 
29 E.g., Board of R.R. Comm'rs v. Great No. Ry., 281 U.S. 412 (1929); Algoma Coal 
&: Coke Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935). 
30 E.g., Aircraft &: Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947); Osmond v. 
Riverdale Manor, Inc., 199 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1952); Gates v. Woods, 169 F.2d 440 (4th 
Cir. 1948). It should be noted that these cases generally apply the doctrine of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies. For criticism of the haphazard use of this doctrine, 
see 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 20.04 (1958). 
31 West India Fruit &: S.S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1948) 
(effectiveness of proposed rate reductions enjoined pending agency decision); Pennsyl-
vania Motor Truck Ass'n v. Port of Philadelphia Marine Terminal Ass'n, 183 F. Supp. 
910 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (effectiveness of loading regulation enjoined to maintain status quo 
pending determination on the merits by an administrative agency). 
